M. Amin Abdullah
Abstrak
This paper will delineate the fundamental structure of
textual-theological rationality (hadarah al-nass) as experienced by Ghazali in
the Muslim’s world and the philosophical rationality (hadarah al-falsafah) as
experienced by Immanuel Kant in the western tradition. Both of them will be
carefully compared and closely analyzed their implication and relevance in
responding the problem of morality and politics to reach a perpetual peace in
the contemporary era.
The textual-theological rationality will find itself in a
grave difficulty to separate morality from politics and easily lead to
religious scripturalism or textualism, not to say fundamentalism, while the
philosophical rationality will have its own ability to distinguish in a clear
dialectical way the area of the basic principle of morality and the arena of
the daily praxis of politics. The idea of separation between state and religion
in western tradition is mistakenly misunderstood by the Muslim theologian and
politician as well who puts much emphasis on the interwovenness of religion and
state.
In spite of difficulty confronted by Muslim political
community, due to the rise of education in the Muslim world, the new generation
of Muslim political thinkers willingly consider the importance of having a new
“enlightened” political thought (al-aql al-siyasy al-jadid al-istitla’i) and
not merely satisfyingly being trapped by the theo-political rationality (al-aql
al-siyasy al-lahuty) in the global village nowadays.
Controversy between Philosophy and Theology (Kalam)
in the Early Period of Islamic Thought
Understandably, philosophical enquiry is unpopular amongst theologians from
numerous religions and amongst religionists in general. This applies for
intellectuals as well as common people. It can be understood that rejection of
philosophical disciplines and logic has been a feature of Islamic culture and
tradition for a significant period of time. Not only in the early period, but
this rejection continues up to a recent time. According to research conducted
by Muhammad Abid al-Jabiry, in the formative period of Islamic culture, Kalam
(Islamic Theology) literature opposed and attacked philosophy for almost 400
years. I quote the result of al-Jabiry’s research as follows:
If we may comment upon the contribution to Islamic thought by Fakr al-Din
Muhammad ibn Umar al-Razi (544-606), -a thinker from the al-Asy’ari school-it
can be confidently stated that al-Razi noted the point of transformation
between theology (ilmu kalam) and philosophy. Since its inception-within
the Mu’tazilah, or in the first generation of ahl sunnah or within the Asy’ariah
where figures like al-Ghazzali and Shahrastani (479-549 H) were
influential-theology (ilmu kalam)proved a great challenge for philosophy
and philosophers. Books written to contest philosophy – both the Platonic and
Muslim philosophers – were in abundance. It can be said that for the first four
centuries, in accordance with the era of the standardization of – the – Islamic
sciences (150-550 H), there was no single text, or composition written by the
theological-experts-both from the Mu’tazilah and the Asy’ariah – which did not
reject or attack the philosophers. Even if we still lack a large number of
these works for reference, it is of absolutely no doubt that al-Ghazali’s work,
Tahafut al-Falasifah and Shahrastani’s Musara’atul Falasifah were
“compulsory reading” for theological writers. Was it not the essential aim of
theology (Kalam) to “oppose people with differing opinions from us?[1]
Why is it controversial ? A part of the whole story which is much more
complicated, it is due to the difference of the fundamental structure of theological
rationality and the philosophical rationality in seeing and
constructing the reality and then in arguing, analyzing and solving the
problems in the real life. Philosophical enquiry places greater emphasis upon
the dimension that are most batiniyyah (spiritual, esoteric),
transcendental, abstract and open-ended, whilst theological enquiry and Kalam
(Islamic theology) especially often places more stress on dimensions which are lahiriyyah
(textual, institutional, exoteric), concrete and final. A philosophical
enquiry into religion represents a more critical, mature and spiritual
approach, whilst a theological approach places greater emphasis upon activity (syi’ar)
which is expressive, communal, outward. Philosophical enquiry places
greater emphasis upon comprehension (aql)whilst theological enquiry
places more emphasis upon transmission (transfer, inheritance, or what is
usually called naql).[2] A
philosophical approach has the character of prophetic philosophy,[3]whilst the
theological approach is more like a priestly religion (an approach
enjoined by monks, popes, ulama, priests, rabbi and so on). A philosophical
approach places more emphasis upon “being religious”, whilst a theological
approach places more emphasis upon “having a religion”. In reality, the
differences between such thought are easily observable.
In the classical Muslim philosophical traditions, Abu Bishr Matta
(870-940), a logician and philosopher, was considered the teacher of the
logician and philosopher al-Farabi (870-950). Abu Bishr Matta was once engaged
in a polemic with a Muslim religious specialist (Mutakallim/theologian),
Abu Sa’id al-Sirafi (893-979).[4] They shared
different opinions regarding the functions and benefits of logic and philosophy
in general for the Islamic world, which was undergoing an efflorescence at the
time.
In the contemporary era, to be more focus in comparing and analyzing the
usage of theology and philosophy as the basis of political discourse in its
relation with morality, I would like to take Ghazali’s thought (1058-1111) as
the representative for Muslim tradition and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) as the
representative for Christian tradition in the Western milieu. Ghazali’s book is
still widely read in the Muslim culture, while Kant’s concept still widely
discussed in the contemporary era.[5] It is
important to have a dialogue between these two thinkers, as Ghazali has a
significant role in building a type of religious thought in Muslim community
which I call it “textual rationality”, while Kant is different from his
predecessors due to his ability to build a type of thought which is “critical
rationality” in essence.
The Spirit of Enlightenment Embedded in the Idea of Moral
Law and Causality in Kant’s Rational Ethics and Its Implication in the Religious
and Political Discourse
Apparently, there is a close relationship and interwovenness between
the idea of law, causality, universality, principle, autonomy and heteromony,
hypothetical and categorical imperative and universality in Kant’s rational
ethics. These key concepts, if it is properly understood, are the building
bricks of enlightenment tradition in the western society. In Kantian sense, a
law, in the strict sense of ‘law’, must hold for all cases and admit no
exceptions. A law of nature, for example, must hold of all events in time
without exception. A law of freedom –that is, the law in accordance with which
a rational agent would act if reason had full control over his inclinations.
This law of freedom or moral law cannot have exception without
ceasing to be a law. There cannot be one moral law for me and another for you.
The law must be the same for all.[6]
In Kant’s technical language, universality is the form of law. Whatever a
law may be about, it must have the form of universality; for unless it is not a
law at all. Laws of freedom and laws of nature in spite of
fundamental differences, share in the common form of universality.
In the discussion of freedom Kant’s work is that of a pioneer. The Greeks
never really came to grasp the subject and did little to carry it beyond
limited questions of legal responsibility. In medieval philosophy there was
real advance, but the problem was considered in theological terms: how was
human freedom to reconciled divine omnipotence and omniscience? Kant separated
the problem of freedom from its legal and theological setting and asked simply
how freedom can be compatible with the causal law with prevails
through nature, and apparently also through human nature.
Assuming that freedom, if it characterises a thing must characterize a
will, Kant begins with a new definitions of ‘will’. He say that “will’ is ‘the
power of a relation being to act in accordance with its conception of laws,
i.e. in accordance with principles.[7] We are told
that ‘the will is a kind causality belonging to living beings so far as they
are rational.[8] Will is
regarded as the power of a rational being to produce effects in the phenomenal
world, and primarily in the physical world. The power to act would commonly be
regarded as a power to produce such effects.[9]
Our will, however, may also produce changes in our own mental world of
inner sense –as when we decide, for example, to think about a particular topic.
If the will is a power to act– or to set oneself to act in accordance with
one’s conception of laws, willing must be conscious, and indeed in some degree
a self-conscious activity. To think of rational beings as endowed with a will
is to think of them as possessing ‘consciousness of their causality in regard
to action.[10]
The word ‘causality’ is commonly used by Kant in two senses. It may mean ‘
a power to produce effects’; and it may mean ‘causal action’. When he says that
the will is a kind of causality, he means that it is a power to produce
effects. When he speaks of an efficient cause as being ‘determined’ to
causality by something else[11], he means that
it is determined to causal action –that it is itself caused to act causally.
Willing may be described as causal action, but ‘the will’ is merely the power
to act causally- that is, to produce effects.
If we conceive the will to be free, we must mean in the first place that
the will is a power to produce effects without being determined –or caused- to
do so by anything other than it self. Freedom is a quality belonging to a
special kind of causality. It is opposed to ‘natural necessity’ or ‘the
necessity of nature’, a quality characterizing all casual action in nature.[12]
How are we to distinguish the laws of nature from what we may now call the
laws of freedom? In nature the causal action of an efficient is it self
caused by something else: it is not spontaneous. This means, according to Kant,
that the law governing causal action in nature is not self imposed but is
imposed by something else. This is what he calls “heteronomy”. Hence if
we are to distinguish the laws of freedom from the laws of nature, we can do
only by supposing that the laws of freedom are selfimposed. The spontaneous
causal action of a free will must take place in accordance with self-imposed
law. But this is just what we mean by “autonomy”; and a free will must
be conceived as acting under the principle of autonomy- that is, as capable of
acting of maxims which can at the same time be willed as universal law.[13]
“Practical propositions”, which are morality in itself, the knowledge of
which plays a part in determining the “will” to make a specific choice among
possible actions. They are called by Kant ‘principles’[14] if they are
general, i.e. if they express general determinations of the will; and
they are called ‘rules’ if they are subsumable under them or derived
from them in their application to specific circumstances.[15] A principle is
called a “maxim”[16], if the
motive which is involved in obedience to it is a motive only for the person who
actuality embraces this maxim as expressing his own policy in life. A principle
is an “Universal law” however, if the motive which it formulates and to which
it gives expression is recognized as proper to the will of every rational
being.[17]
Every ‘principle’ to some extent constrains the person who
acknowledges it. Even if my ‘principle’ is a mere maxim that holds only for
myself, such as the maxim of not allowing any wrong done by me to go unavenged.
It constrains me. At least sometimes to bring my momentary impulse (e.g. fear)
into line with this general purpose or determination of the will. Even such a
‘principle’, therefore, can give rise to rule which determine what I, with this
motive, ought to do and would do if I (a) had this policy and (b) were
completely rational in the choice actions with respect to this policy. Such
rules are called ”imperatives”[18] for a being
who, like man, does not always willingly and spontaneously do what is
prescribed by reason as necessary for the carrying-out of the purpose. It is
only by reasoning that we know what we ought to do in
order to carry out the policy expressed in the maxim, but no one is so rational
that he does what he ought to do without more or less frequent conflict
with his inclinations.
If a principle is really a maxim, so that the motive for action in
accordance with it, is some subjective condition, the corresponding imperative.
Which tells us that a reasonable man would do in order to satisfy this desire
if he had, is a “hypothetical imperative”[19] it commands or
rather counsels, a man only if he has the desire question . The dynamic factor
in obedience to such an imperative is desire or impulse.
A law, on the other hand, such as ‘lying is wrong’ is not addressed just to
a man who wishes for honor or some other specific goal. The imperative which
expresses this law to a man who does not obey it by nature is ”categorical
imperative”.[20] It does not
tell us to avoid lying if we would obtain a good reputation; it tells us not to
lie, period. It seems to be addressed to rational beings generally not just to
those men having specific desires that can be satisfied through obedience to
it.
A law must have objective necessity, recognized by reason, but the presence
or absence of a specific desire can be known only empirically. Furthermore, a
law gives rise to imperatives which are definite and specific, yet universal in
application, but the diversity of desire is so great that even if they are all
subsumed under the general desire for happiness, they do not issue forth in
anything more than general counsels, proverbs, and good advice which is
sensitives to the variety of men and circumstances.[21]
Up to this point, I have tried to draw attention to the difference between
“hypothetical” and “categorical” imperative, since this is most
crucial point in Kant’s theory of ethical rationality particularly in its
relevance with his theory of morality and politics. Every principle or rule
which presupposes, for its application some specific desire falls under the
general principle of self-love or the desire for one’s own happiness; for a
state of happiness is one in which there is continuous satisfaction of all
desires. Those philosophers who make the desire for the happiness the proper
motive for morality cannot derive from it any universal precepts for each man’s
conception of happiness differs from that of others, and any one man’s
conception varies from time to time according to the state of his specific
desire. No rule derived from the desire for happiness is more than a
hypothetical imperative, and it therefore lacks the a priori necessity
characteristic of law. If so, what makes the ‘categorical imperative’
universal, a priori and rational? For Kant, besides the ‘material’ of maxim,
however, there is also its ‘form’[22] which is an ‘ought’;
just as the form of every theoretical proposition is ‘is’. As ‘form’, it
is independent of any specific desire which constitutes the content of specific
desire. If we abstract from an imperative all contents by virtue of which it is
addressed to a person motivated by a specific subjective desire, we are left
with only the ‘form’, the skeletal ‘ought’. What is derivable from this, unlike
what is derivable from any specific content, is addressed to all rational
beings who act, and the rules derived from it are fitted to be universal in
application. That is, the ‘form’ of a maxim and not is content determines
whether it is a law or a mere maxim.
The moral law as Kant puts is this: A purely rational being acts only on
maxims which he would will to be maxims for all rational beings, i.e., only on
maxims that could be willed to be principles universally binding on all
such beings. This is expressed in the categorical imperative as: “So act
that the maxim of your will could always hold at the same time as the principle
for giving universal law”.[23]
Those are the key elements of Kantian rational ethics. Significantly, this
basic concept has a great impact on Kant’s thought on religions and politics as
well. He is very consistent in applying his genuine concept in these two
different areas. First of all, I would like to discuss the crucial point in
Kant’s thought dealing with morality and religion, then, right after this I
will discuss its relationship with morality and politics. Importantly, in
discussing religion, he clearly differentiates between the domain of
“ecclesiastical faith” and the area of “pure religious faith”. As it is found
in morality, there is also what is called “pure” and “empirical” element of
religion[24].
In the plurality of world-religions or ‘ecclesiastical faith’ (Kirchenglauben)[25], Kant sees the
single aim of establishing a pure religious faith (reine Religionglaube).
These attempts are, to be sure, imperfect and conditioned by historical circumstances,
but they are nonetheless recognizable approximations of the idea of ‘people of
God’
Pure religious faith is concerned only with what constitutes
the essence of reverence for God, namely obedience, ensuing from the moral
disposition, to all duties as his commands; a church, on the other
hand, as the union of many men with such dispositions into a moral
commonwealth, requires a public covenant, a certain ecclesiastical form
dependent upon the conditions of experience.[26]
Pure religious faith is therefore not the alternative the opposite of
ecclesiastical faith. Rather it is the true and rational essence of
ecclesiastical faith. Ecclesiastical faith is the ‘vehicle’, of pure rational
faith. It is the ‘shell’ which contains the rational kernel of pure religious
faith[27]. Thus
religion, like human knowledge and practice, has both a pure and an empirical
part.
Ecclesiastical faith, however, is at its best imperfect vehicle of pure
religious faith. Ecclesiastical faiths are numerous, divided into competing
sects. Futher, they base their claim not on reason, but an empirical
revelation, as transmitted through a historically, conditioned tradition. For
both these reasons, no ecclesiastical faithcan lay claim to true
universality.“An historical faith”, says Kant, “grounded solely on facts,
can extend its influence no futher than tidings of it can reach, subject to
circumstances of time and place and dependent on the capacity of men to judge
the credibility of such tiding.[28]
Ecclesiastical faiths are moreover often not content with the service of
God through obedience to His will, but hope to placate God, or to win divine
favor by means other than morally good conduct. Ecclesiastical faith is thus
subject to the danger of ‘religious illusion’ (Wahn), the belief
that man can become well-pleasing to God by means other than a morally good
disposition[29].
Kant does not condemn practice of this kind as such, but condems the belief
that they constitute a genuine duty to God, or a essential part of religion.
This belief transforms faith (Glaube) into supersition (Aberglaube).[30]
We cannot rest content, therefore, with ecclesiastical faiths as the
vehicle for pure religious faith, but must attempt to further the ideal of
moral community of men through the use of our reason.[31] Ecclesiastical
faiths is thus not only the vehicle for pure religious faith, but it is also
the historical prerequisite for a moral community of men founded on pure
religious faith. Men must set free pure religious faith from its shell.[32]
How is this to be done? It cannot be done through abolition of
ecclesiastical faith by ‘external revolution’, says Kant, but must, like all
human progress, be carried out through a gradual reform according to fixed
principles.[33] The principle
of progress toward a moral community is enlightenment. The service of God must
become “first and foremost a free and hence a moral service.[34] Through
enlightenment man is released from his self-incurred tutelage, freed by his own
use of reason from his subjection to arbitrary statues and the particular
historical tradition through which ecclesiastical faith has presented itself to
him.
Kant does not, however, intend to say that ecclesiastical faith, its
practices and its historical tradition shall be abolished by progress. He
rather says that it is to come to an understanding of itself as a vehicle for
pure religious faith so better to serve the pure faith which is its essence.
Kant thus looks forward to an epoch when ecclesiastical faith will be no longer
any more than a mere vehicle for pure religious faith, and he expresses the
hope that:
In the end religion will gradually be freed from all empirical determining
grounds and from all statues which rest on history and which through the agency
of ecclesiastical faith provisionally unite men for the requirement of the
good; and thus at least the pure religion of reason will rule over all, “so
that God may be all in all.[35]
If we could understand Kant’s thought on revelatory or religious ethics, we
would find at least four main features which he wants to underline. The
first is the idea of moral law as the one valid path to faith in God,
without saying that morality should be grounded on ‘revelation’. The second
is the social dimension of religious ethics, namely that the goodness is not
merely centered and possessed by an individual but also has to be flourished
and embedded in the social life. The third is that the individual human
being should be ’active’ in pursuing those virtues and happiness, not only to
say that he has to wait for God’s bounty and grace. And the fourth that
the adherence of the historical religious –any historical religions– has to
think and to put emphasis on the essence and the pure element of religious
teaching which is universal. This element of universality in revelatory ethics
can only be seen from the vantage of intellectual perspective, namely by our
human reason itself. This pure element of historical or revealed religion is
much more important, for Kant, in order to gain the ultimate purpose of
morality propagated by any religion.
Now, after having a long journey to understand the kernel of Kant’s
rational ethics and its application in religion, how does Kant apply this
rational ethics in the domain of morality and politics? He is consistent in
applying his ethical theory in the area of politics. The classification of
“heteronomy” and “autonomy” is clearly rehearsed in his work on perpetual
peace. In this book we can easily find the key concepts under the category of
“heteronomy” such as particular, might, prudence, material principle, political
moralist, problema technicum, political prudence, empirical principle of
political wisdom, subjective reality, conditional necessity. While those
concepts such as universal, right, duty, formal principle, moral politician, problem
a morale, political wisdom, pure concept of the duty of right, pure
principle of right, objective reality and unconditional necessity are under the
category of “autonomy”.[36]
For Kant, the end of building state is to obtain “perpetual peace”. It is a
duty. It is categorical imperative. It must be derived from the ‘formal’ principle
of the maxim of external actions. In that way, he differentiates between
political moralist and moral politician. The former is merely problem of
technique (problema technicum), while the later is an ethical problem (problema
morale). The problem of technique faced by the political moralist needs
political prudence namely being clever in the management of practical affairs,
and much knowledge of nature is required so that its mechanism may be employed
toward the desired end; but all this is uncertain in its result for perpetual
peace, with whatever sphere of public law we are concerned.
While the second problem encountered by the moral politician needs
political wisdom. This wisdom presses itself upon us. It is autonomous and
unconditional. It is clear to everyone. It leads directly to the end, but
remembering the individual choice; it does not hasten to do so by force;
rather, it continously approaches it under the conditions offered by favourable
circumstance.[37]
It is Kant’s belief that political maxims must not be desired from the
welfare or happiness which a single state expects from obedience to them, and
thus not from the end which one of them proposes for itself. They must not be
deduced from volition as the supreme yet empirical principle of of political
wisdom, but rather from the pure concept of the duty of right, from the
ought whose principle is given a priori by pure reason, regardless of what the
physical consequences may be.[38]
Objectively or theoretically, there is no conflict between morals and
politics. However, subjectively, in the selfish propensity of men, this
conflict will always remain. The ruler and people, or nation and nation, do
each other no injustice when by violence they make war on each other, although
they do commit injustice in general. In that case, they refuse to respect the
concept of right, which alone could establish perpetual peace.[39]
It is Kant’s rigorous belief that true politics can never take a step
without rendering homage to morality. Though politics by itself as a difficult
art, its union with morality is no art at all, for this union cuts the knot
which politics could not untie when they were in conflict. The rights of men
must be held sacred, however much sacrifice it may cost the ruling power. One
cannot compromise here and seek the middle course of a pragmatic conditional
law between the morally right and the expendient. All politics must bend its
knee before the right. A perpetual peace, for Kant, is precondition for
having a state. It is unconditional for who are in power. It is ground of moral
politics. The basis for all politician in ruling the people, whatever the
empirical situation of this people are. By this foundation, the ruler can not
be trapped by either side of conflictual contestant, inside and outside the
group. Day to day political affairs are heteronomous. These can not be
extracted to be the law of moral politic. It is only a perpetual peace, which
is a priory, unconditional, autonomous that ties all partners which can be
universalized.
The spirit of religious textual rationality embedded in the idea of divine
assistance and the dominant role of sheikh tutelege in Ghazali’s religious
ethics.
The key concept closely related to Muslim’s conception of ethical norms is
God revelation, God’s revelation in the form of commandement, Hidayah (divine
guidance), rusdh (divine providence), tasdid (divine assistance),
ta’yid (divine support), the virtues of divine assistance (al-fadail
al-tauqifiyyah), unaided reason, favours from God (fadl min allah),
orcasionalism, individual salvation, no universal ethical norms, the dominant
role of sheikh (moral tutelege).
Islamic theology or ‘ilm al-Kalam in the Muslim culture is a type of
rationality. It is a product and construction of human conception. I would like
to specify this peculiar product of human thought as textual rationality, due
to fact that the kernel of this type of rationality is deduced from religious
text, namely revelation. From time to time, a serious research on this peculiar
type of religious thought is abundant. According to al-Jabiry “The science of
Islamic theology (ilm al-Kalam), in its historical implementation is not
merely focused on the discussion of Islamic creed (aqidah), but it is
also in the same time is the implementation and the praxis of politics in
religion”.[40] From this
starting point, it is a common belief of Muslim from the early period to the
contemporary era that there is no separation between “religion” and “politics”.
Muslim fundamentalist refuses the idea of separation between “religion” and
“state”. This notion is not confined in a country which Muslim are the
majority of population. Almost all adherents of other religions claim the same
ideology, although with different levels of interpretation and demand.[41]
In order to grasp in more detail, how is this scriptural-theological
understanding of religion is originally constructed, let us see Ghazali’s
conception on morality and religion. It is the characteristic of his
ethical conception, whilst refusing the idea of law being applied in nature and
human behaviour, he replaces the idea of law in Kantian sense with the
personalized moral guide or “sheikh” in his comprehensive religious ethical
concepts. That means that Ghazali prefers more emphasis on the socio-political
aspect of religion rather than intellectual and rational aspect of it. This
personalized moral tutalage eventually embodied in the form of paternalistic
type of political leadership.
Four principal virtues–namely, practical wisdom, courage, temperance and
justice- occupy a central position in Ghazali’s treatment of philosophic
virtues in its connection with the psychological basis. But he also shows that
the good can only be perfected when accompanied by the goods of the body
health, strength, beauty, and long life; and the bodily goods, in turn, cannot
be useful without the external goods- wealth, fame and noble birth Ghazali
calls all these goods “bounties” (ni’am),”form of happiness” (sa’adat),
and “virtues” (fada’il).[42] These domains,
from Kantian perspective, belong to heteromony domain of morality. It cannot be
uplifted or extracted as a ground for moral law.
Ghazali’s agreement with Aristotle goes beyond the mere enumeration
of external and bodily goods which comprise the instruments for obtaining
happiness. By calling these types of happiness bounties, Ghazali suggest that
happiness is a gift which God bestows a favor.[43] Aristotle also
maintains that happiness is somehow a divine gift, even when it is achieved as
a result of human action. Ultimately, happiness does not depend completely on
the human will for its realization. There remains some element of happiness
which cannot be acquired but must be bestowed as a God-given blessing.
Aristotle says:
Now if anything that men have is a gift of the gods, it is reasonable to
suppose that happiness is divinely given-indeed, of all men’s possessions it is
most likely to be so, inasmuch as it is the best of them all. This subject
however may perhaps more properly belong to another branch of study.[44]
Aristotle may be suggesting here a ‘theology’ or ‘metaphysics’ of
happiness, even though he does not reopen this question in the metaphysics or
elsewhere. Ghazali, in contrast, treats this question explicitly when he
discusses a fourth category of goods which he calls “the virtues of divine
assistance” (al-fadâ’ill al-tawfiqiyya).
While regarding bodily and external good as useful and important
instruments for the attainment of virtue of the soul, Ghazali considers the
virtues of divine assistance necessary and essential to the virtues of the
souls. Indeed, no virtue at all can be acquired without divine assistance.[45] According to
Ghazali, assistance (tawfiq) is a divine favor, which he defines as the
concord of man’s will and action with God’s decree and determination.[46]
In the Qur’an the term fadl is several times attributed to God
alone; for instance, ‘that is the free gift of God; He giveth it to whom He
Willeth”.[47] Qur’anic
verses combine fadl and ni’ma, such as “… joyful in blessing (ni’ma)
and bounty (fadl) from God”,[48] and in all
cases the virtues of divine assistance are spoken of as gifts or favors from
God (fadl min allâh).
Thus, by applying the term virtue to divine assistance Ghazali attributes
it to God. In so doing he emphasizes that no other virtues can be achieved
without divine assistance. He even maintains that without divine assistance
man’s own effort in seeking virtue is in vain and may even lead to what is
wrong and evil.[49] This statement
suggests that the religious virtues are fundamentally different from the
philosophic virtues: philosophic virtues can be understood completely in terms
of human choice, whereas the basis of the religious virtues of divine
assistance must be sought in the bounties of God. Within this new framework,
divine support of morality becomes crucial for the realization of ultimate happiness.
In the final section of Book I of Quarter III of the Ihya’, which is the
key work in the discussion of vices and virtues, Ghazali says that some people
are created for paradise and others for hellfire, and that each person will be
divinely directed toward that for which he is created.[50] By this
statement Ghazali tightly locks the doors for the possibility of human reason
to think about his own end, giving thereby less suggestion towards reasoning in
the way to reach this important human destination.
In order to understand this position, it is necessary to discuss the
virtues and divine assistance in greater detail. Since they are related to God
and are discussed in a theological context, the virtues of a divine assistance
are in fact religious and theological virtues. Ghazali maintains that there are
four of these virtues, namely God’s guidance (Hidayat Allâh)[51]. His direction
(rushd)[52], His divine
leading (tasdid)[53], and His
support (ta’yid).[54] Ghazali
intentionally makes these virtues correspond in number to external and bodily
goods, as well as to the four principal virtues of the soul.
The virtues of divine assistance are not to be found within the
strict limits of philosophic tradition. Rather, Ghazali is inspired here by the
Islamic theological tradition, and his special contribution consists in his
effort to define, classify, and relate these virtues to those of the soul. In
dealing with these virtues, he emphasizes primarily that man cannot attain
virtue without God’s assistance. For him, God is the ultimate source of good
and evil because He is the cause of everything.
The basic issue here is the assertion that without God’s aid man cannot
attain happiness and thus there is no assurance that the philosophic virtues
will lead to happiness which is their end. Surely, they cannot be the
philosophic virtue because Ghazali does not believe that unaided reason is
able to know the exact nature of such things, further more, anything which
comes about as a result of an assumed free will of man is only an illusion.
Thus the only way for man to know the real things which call forth God’s
assistance is through God’s revelation in the form of commandments. Therefore
only by fulfilling these commandment can men assure for themselves the
possibility of acquiring virtue and consequently of attaining happiness. Since
these commandments are originated from the revelatory and religious text, not
from reason or intuition, it is the basic root of religious textualism and
scripturalism in the Muslim religiosity.
In Ghazali’s conception, virtue becomes primarily religious-legal virtue.
Ghazali even goes so far as to equate virtue here with the act to obedience to
God (ta’a), and therefore investigation of the Islamic virtues is
fundamentally a description of the proper way carrying out the divine
commandments. In Ghazali’s view, divine commandments and the judgments derived
from them are divided into two parts: those which are concerned primarily with
belief and action directed towards God, and those which consist of the action
which man directs towards his fellow man. The former class he calls acts of
worship (ibadat), such as prayer (salah), purity (thahara),
alm-tax (zaka), fasting (sawm) and pilgrimage (hajj)[55], while the
latter he calls custom (adat) such as food, marriage, business
transaction, permissible and forbidden things, companionship, and travel.[56]
What is the implication and consequence of having such type of religious-textual
rationality? The absence of the idea of causality in Ghazali’s mind has a great
impact in his conception of the idea of universality in ethical norms. Ghazali
totally refuses such an idea. Ghazali’s refutations of rational universal rules
occur in various places in his works. Following G.F. Hourani, I shall attempt a
systematic exposition of his arguments according in their forms, bringing
together under each one what he says in different places. According to Ghazali,
the claim of rational universal rules fails several test that it should meet if
it is to be accepted.
1. All proposed rational rules fail in universality. “Killing is evil” is
not universal, for the Mu’tazila, themselves, a school of rational Islamic
theology which Ghazali refuses and opposes, immediately qualify the judgment
with exceptions: killing is not evil when it is punishment for crime.[57] ”Lying is
evil” is not universal, because it is permitted
and even required to lie to save a prophet’s life[58]. “Spreading
peace is good” is not universal; it is untrue in circumstances of dire
necessity[59]. These and
similar propositions are only generally true: they are thus not fit to be major
premises in demonstrative practical syllogism, but are only suitable for
conjectural use in legal arguments.[60]
2. The supposed universal ethical truths fail to pass the subjective test
of indubitable certainty which is required for all intuited first principles of
the intellect. Here Ghazali argues that “if you were to come into existence
fully rational but without experience and images, you would be able to doubt
such premises as ‘killing a man is evil’, or at least to hesitate about them,
but you could not doubt the principle that negation and affirmation cannot
be true of the same state of thing or two is greater than one”.[61]This example is
not perhaps very appropriate, since it might well be urged that a person
described here would not be able make any judgment at all about such a moral
rule, since he would be totally abstracted from any community which provides
the appropriate context for ethical life. Such a person would not be in a good
position to comment on the moral rule’s universality and necessity, since he
might not even be able to grasp what a moral rule meant. But the general
tenor of the argument is valid, namely, that there is an important distinction
between necessary truths of logic and mathematics and the sort of ‘truths’
which constitute ethics.
3. Any proposition that is intuited immediately or necessarily (bi-d-darura)
must command unanimous agreement. But the suggested rational truths of
ethics fail to do so, for important Islamic schools disagree with them. The
Mu’taliza retort that the disagreement is on the theory of ethical knowledge,
such as the question here is issue, but not on first order normative
propositions, which are what they consider rational. But this untrue,
says Ghazali, there are also disagreements in normative knowledge, for example
on the wrongness of inflicting pain on animals: this is claimed by the
Mu’tazila as known by reason, but God in scripture has revealed approval
for it, in animal sacrifices.[62]
4. If wâjib is understood in the correct Ghazalian sense of
‘necessary to produce benefits, it is impossible for reason to demonstrate this
kind of wujûb for any of the Mu’tazilite rules. Ghazali expounds his
refutation lucidly in Mustasfa, proceeding by a definition and series of
dilemmas.
Gratitude to a benefactor is not necessary by reason contrary to the
Mu’tazila. The proof of this is that ‘necessary’ (al-wajib) has no
meaning but what God the Exalted has made necessary (awjabahu) and
commanded with threat of punishment for omission; so if there is no revelation
what the meaning of ‘necessary’[63]
Ghazali’s refutation is unconvincing to a detached observer, for it assumes
his own definition of wâjib, as stated and his own theodicy in
which reward for human merits cannot be inferred from the divine nature. But on
their own definition of wâjib in the sense of ‘obligatory’ the Mu’tazila
would not have to prove that reason sees the benefit of acts to agents, but
only their obligatoriness, a concept that Ghazali does not seem to grasp
at any stage and we must admit after the struggles of the modern ethical
philosophy that it is a puzzling concept. But even if the Mu’tazila were
required to prove a rational knowledge of the otherworldly benefits of
fulfilling obligations, they could do so on their own theodicy by inferring
reward for human merits from the justice of God in His acts, a justice that
sprang from His nature and was to be understood in the same sense as human
justice. In the same vein Ghazali argues in Mi’yar as follows:
These are exemplified by our judging it good to spread peace, feed others,
bestow largesse on kinsfolk, adhere to truthfulness in speech, observe justice
in legal suits and judgements; and by our judging it bad that one should harm
humans, kill animals, disseminate slander-that husbands should acquiesce in the
licentiousness of their wives, that benevolence should be repaid with
ingratitude and oppression[64]
Then he goes to refute the rational universality of ethical norms with
similar ones as we already cited. He thus denies those rational judgments by
rather unsatisfactory arguments through selecting a putative universal rule and
then pointing to cases where it can be applied.
In addition to what has been explained above, what is important to be noted
here is that in contrast with Avicenna who emphasizes the usefulness of the
acts of worship in sustaining God’s rememberance and the resurrection in the
hereafter and also essential for the continuance of social life.[65]Ghazali finds
in the act of worship very little political and social virtues, and his
apparent aim in dealing with them is to emphasize their importance for the
individual salvation[66]and the part
play in helping him master his passions, schooling him in virtue, and above
all, enabling him to seek divine assistance in order that he may attain
happiness.
The movement of Ghazali’s thought from ‘philosophy’ to ‘theology’, or from
‘philosophic ethics’ to ‘religious ethic’, actually, starts from his critique
of rational metaphysics in Tahafut. In Ghazali’s conception of religious
ethics, the problem of causality comes to the fore. Ghazali refuses the idea of
casuality in religious ethics, since the law of causality inevitably
presupposes the use ot ‘reason’ in religious field. Whereas, from the early
beginning, Ghazali has sharply separated between ‘ulûm shar’iyya and ‘ulûm
aqliyya. Instead of depending on ‘reason’, Ghazali choses ‘psychology’ which
is much more attached to the ‘emotion’ rather than ‘reason’.
The clear realization of Ghazali’s conception in refusing the idea of
causal law in morality is exemplified in his choice of the ‘divine guidance’ to
lend human beings to get the right path for their ethical conduct. He picks up
the verses which denote the virtues of divine assistance are a gift or favour
from God, not from the human endeavour. The most clear implication of
this choice is the absence of the idea of law in Ghazali’s framework of thought
in general.
Based on that conception, there is only one available traffic to obtain the
ethical and religious virtues, namely from God’s initiative. Ghazali does not
have a conception which underlies the possibility of human initiative as an active
subject to obtain those ultimate virtues. As a result, he denies the notion
that the divine commandments in the Qur’an had any purpose (they were rather to
be obeyed merely because they were divine commandments).
This line of thought will be much more clear in the following discussion
concerning Ghazali’s theory of mystical ethics. For Ghazali, even ‘religious
ethics’ is not sufficient to guide human beings to acquire and to attain
virtues. It is only ‘mystical ethics’ that will fulfill this demand. Now, we
will see a step further where Ghazali removes the actual function of human
reason to grasp and to strive in obtaining those ultimate virtues and to
conduct life based on the guiding principle of revelation and reason, not to
say merely by revelation without reason.
Nevertheless, it is apparent that Ghazali cannot totally escape from the
intervention of human agency in discussing morality and ethical norms. Supposed
he were successfully throws and subordinates the role of “reason” as the ground
for morality, but finally he encounters serious pitfall when he replaces the
role of “reason” with the role of moral tutelage embodied in the idea of sheikh
in his ultimate concept of mystical ethics. This means that Ghazali
unintentionally puts the primacy of the socio-political aspect of religion
rather than its critical-philosophical aspect of the religion.
Putting God’s gift or grace the human ultimate purpose may not be a problem
in itself, for Kant also emphasizes the role of’divine grace’ to solve the
problem of human despair to attain the highest moral and ethical virtues. What
is crucial here is Ghazali’s conception of the role of ‘spiritual teacher’ or
‘moral guide’ (shaykh) in the main body of his system of thought. The
role of spiritual teacher is so prominent in Muslim community so that Sufism or
mysticism becomes virtually a cult of personalities.[67] Ghazali
himself declares.
The disciple murid must of necessity have recourse to director (shaykh)
to guide him a right. For the way of faith is obscure, but the Devil’s ways are
many and patent, and he who has no shaykh to guide him will be led by the devil
into his ways. Wherefore the disciple must cling to his leader, confiding
himself to him entirely, opposing him in no matter whatsoever, and binding
himself to follow him absolutely. Let him know that the advantage he gains from
the error of his syaykh, if he should err, is greater than advantage he gains
from his own righness, if he should be right.[68]
The implication of having such a doctrine is obvious. In any system of
thought in which the spiritual dictatorship of spiritual teacher is so salient,
it is hardly possible to place the role of reason in its appropriate place and
in its maximum function. There seems to be no place for the human reason to
develop itself naturally and autonomously. In other words, Ghazali does not
agree with the ‘active part’ played by our human initiative and endeavor or
attain those ethical virtues. For Ghazali, these is no such a basic law like
principle, on the basis of which one would act morally to obtain virtues. The
only principle in mind is spiritual teacher’s guidance, no matter what his
quality is. The idea of ‘spiritual teacher’ becomes the trade mark of sufism
and mysticism and relegates the origin of Ghazali’s statement that says: “Thou
shalt be in the hands of thy Shaykh like a dead body in the hands of its
clearser” is a well-known aphorism summing up this teaching.[69]
The phenomenon of the attribution of miracles to the saints or spiritual
teacher constitutes a very interesting chapter in the history of Sufism. It
must remain true that by far the largest number of ‘miracles’ were conscious
products designed or enhance the prestige or certain saint or shaykh or
the order connected with his name. But there is also the important fact that
the large the principle of the absolute authority of the spritual teacher was
practiced, the greater was the degree of passivity, suggestibility and
susceptibility of the common run of disciples.[70]
What is important here is to see the relationship between accepting the
idea of spiritual teacher along with an artificial miracle attributed to him
with the idea of refuting the principle of causality. It is well-known that
Ghazali, while he is suggesting that the disciples should absolutely follow his
spiritual teacher he also refuse the idea of causality. The idea of causality
in its very essence is rational, since the notion of cause and effect can only
be grasped by the autonomy of our human intellectual or rational capacity. It
is clear that there is a close connection between Ghazali’s refutation of the
idea of causality in nature[71] and in human
morality[72]. The former is
intended to safeguard the nation of miracle, while the latter is to strengten
God’s omnipotence to bestow his ‘divine gift’. In the long run, this original
conception has important contribution to mold a way of thought which puts
emphasis upon a spiritual and deprives the autonomy of human reason to think
independently.
Toward Global Society: Is Religion the Obstacle?
The discussion on Ghazali and Kant is not intended to rewind the historical
clock but also represents the current debate on the notion and the
applicability of human right, the idea of progress, the notion of social equity
overshadowed by the issue of religious exclusivism in today’s postcolonial era.
How can we sincerely appreciate and reconcile the idea of
cosmopolitanism-globalism and the indigenousism-localism in the same time?
Where can we proportionally put the notion and the demand of perpetual peace in
the mids of those various religious resurgence movements in all part of the world?
It is clear, indeed, that perpetual peace is not an idea that located in
the cultural, religious and ethnical vacuum. Whilst the strife for cultural,
religious, and ethnical right and identity without being accompanied by some
sort of inner ability to compromise in all level of life will make it rigid,
inflexible, impatience, aggressive, apologetics and easily slippered into
hardliners, radicalism and extreemism.
Human civilization and its predicament today encounters a serious and
critical dilemma. The difficult situation lively experienced by Bush and
Saddam can reflect how deep this dilemma is confronted by human civilization.
How can we reconcile the non-negotiable universal, the basic principle of
humanity and the need to nurture and sustain the social, cultural, political
and religious rights of each community in this global village. A western and
Muslim culture encourters this dilemma.
On behalf of rationality and modernity, we cannot abolish the cultural and
religious right of people elsewhere. On the contrary, in the name of the ardent
defender and the custodian of the right of “particular” culture, religion,
ethnicity cannot overclaim its own valuable principle, regardless the right’s
of other “particular” culture, religious and ethnic group. By saying this, it
does not mean that there is no such difficulty and problematic issue embedded
within one’s own particular society, either in the West or in the East; either
in Christian or in Muslim. A clash within civilization is always there
and sometimes more serious than the class of civilization.
A global civil society is not something given, ready made concept, readily
to be implemented. It is always characterized by on going process of debate,
negotiation, and formation. Its space is not certain yet. It is not in the
space of “in” and also not in the space of “out”. It is always in the space of
“between” which is full of risk, temptations and rapid fluidity. Every “part”
has its own share and responsibility to build the “whole”. The “whole” itself
cannot be set up without the part. Every part namely nations, states, societies
and communities has its own responsibility to seriously disseminate the idea of
perpetual peace in their own style in the era of global civil society. And it
is not easy task. It is challenging over time. Only by this continous and
endless efforts, the dream of having global civil society will come true.
Building a perpetual peace in the global civil society is not easy task,
since within its internal part there are many varieties of interests,
ideologies, ideal types that are not easily compromised. This new rationality
in the post colonial era, which is able to appreciate the need of the part and
strengthen the need of the whole is full of predicament and risk. Only by long
qualified education, this dream comes true. This qualified civic education
unnecessarily relegates or eradicates the existing religious affiliation. Some
Muslim thinkers in contemporary era such as Muhammad Abid al-Jabiry, Hasan
Hanafi, M. Arkoun, Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid, Abdullah Ahmed al-Naim and many others
are ready to revisit and reformulate the concept of Islamic religiosity in
order to be put in a fit proporsion with the global need for building and
sustaining the global civil society by way of reformulating and
reconceptualizing the approaches and methodology in Islamic studies.
From our close examination, we see that the system of thought which belongs
to Ghazali as the representation of Muslim culture and the system of thought
which belongs to Kant as the representation of Western tradition in the era of
enlightenment are quite different within their respective traditions. I
sincerely do not claim that what I have been trying to depict can represent the
‘exact’ system of thought of those respective traditions . In some cases, there
are overlapping features between both system of thought, namely, Islamic and
Western.
Nevertheless, when we trace back to the original sources, namely Ghazali’s
work and Kant’s work, we can easily find the aroma of tension there. It is
important to note here that both systems of thought are still alive from the
very first day of their emergence until this very day. The purpose of rewinding
this historical clock is not to dismiss one system of thought and appreciate
the other. But rather I would like to regard both system of thought as the
valuable legacy of human history which has been unfolding itself within certain
traditions. It is impossible that one can relagate any tradition in the course
of time. The existence of each system of thought is valid and legitimate
although each system of thought has its own limits, weaknesses and strengths.
My aim in this comparation has been a simple one. Due to the above
consideration, what we need actually is a kind of mutual and inter dialogue
between the custodians of both system of thought. In other words, what we need
is a kind of cultural dialogue in order to get the benefit from each other and
to share ideas among the participant of dialogue, to solve this difficulty as
well as other human problems in general.
In our pluralistic society, it is only through ‘dialogue’, namely, intra
and intercultural dialogue that will guide us to go beyond the ‘impasse’ of
universalism or particularism in their literal meaning. With a dialogue we can
acquaint and be well informed with the problem which is faced by our
neighbouring cultures. A prejudice is only the result of exclusiveness. And
exclusiveness is not an appropriate way to solve the human problem. Only by
that kind of ‘dialogue’, the psychological demand of having some kind of
cultural superiority can be reduced to a minimum degree.
Take for an example, Kant’s system of thought whose main feature is
‘rational’, it is possible to say that since this system aims at the dominance
of reason over nature it would lead to the grave problem of ecology which
threatens the whole life of human being. But, Ghazali’s system of thought also
faces the great problem of exclusiveness of thought. Both of them may be
considered harmful to the whole community of human beings.
There is another and yet more important reason for the need of dialogue.
Both Ghazali and Kant are merely the product of ‘individual’ thinkers who rely
on their individual thought. The problem of pluralistic society cannot be
solved, to be sure, by merely ‘individual thoughts’[73]. By relying on
‘revelation’ alone or by depending on ‘reason’ alone, our global human problem
cannot be solved satisfactorily.
What we need today is a kind of ‘team-work’ between those diverse
custodians of particular ethical norms. The individual thinkers are not adequate
anymore, no matter how high the validity of their ideas is. The idea of
community in the term of the ‘team work’ has to be put forward in order to open
the dialogue between these two or more defenders of system of thought. From the
dialogue something new will appear, not only to say and to formulate the
problem in two limited particular dichotomical approach. But the nature of this
dialogue can be clarified in another discipline, by studying, in the above
discussed manner, different systems of thought within their respective
cultures. If my discussion above appears to be a dichotomical approach that
only a matter of strategy to decipher the problem into its detail items to get
the clearness of the basic problem. By acquainting the body of both systems of
thought, it will give more opportunity to open many possibilities to have a
mutual dialogue to construct and to build a global civil society in the
contemporary era.
UIN Sunan Kalijaga
14 December 2004
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